Fault Detection and Exclusion for INS/GPS/5G Tightly-Coupled Navigation

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Abstract—A solution separation-based fault detection and exclusion (FDE) framework is developed for GPS and 5G signal of opportunity (SOP) aided inertial navigation system (INS). The proposed framework fuses an inertial measurement unit (IMU) with GPS and 5G pseudorange measurements in a tightly-coupled fashion via an extended Kalman filter to estimate the ground vehicles' attitude, position, velocity, and clock errors. Solution separation tests are exploited to detect and exclude faults from GPS and 5G signals due to transmitter failures and local threats in urban environments (e.g., multipath). Experimental results are presented to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed framework under different sensor fusion scenarios. It is shown that fusing 5G signals enhances the FDE performance of the multi-sensor system in a suburban scenario: while INS/GPS fails to detect faulty GPS measurements, the INS/GPS/5G system is able to detect the fault. Moreover, over a trajectory of 1.91 km traversed in 200 s, using signals from two 5G gNbs, the INS/GPS/5G system achieved a position root-mean squared error (RMSE) of 0.81 m and maximum position error of 2.17 m. The undetected GPS fault in the INS/GPS system increased the RMSE and maximum position error to 1.83 m and 4.25 m, respectively.

Index Terms—opportunistic navigation, RAIM, fault detection, solution separation, 5G.

I. INTRODUCTION

The world is fast approaching an era of autonomous driving, which is powered by recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI), computing, communication as well high-precision navigation technologies. However, ensuring safety of the automated driving function is one of the most significant obstacles facing the development, commercialization, and adoption of fully-automated vehicles. Analysis of reported accidents that involved automated vehicles indicate that most of the wrong decisions from the self-driving system are triggered by failures in the positioning, navigation, and perception system [1].

Ground vehicle navigation systems utilize global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers and a suite of onboard sensors, e.g., lidar, camera, radar, inertial navigation system (INS), etc. GNSS receivers are relied upon to provide a navigation solution in a global frame and to correct for accumulating errors due to the bias and drift of sensor dead reckoning. While achieving higher levels of navigation accuracy has been a classic requirement, the trustworthiness in the navigation solution, commonly assessed by integrity measures, as well as the ability of fault detection and exclusion (FDE) is evermore vital in the safety-critical application of automated driving. To ensure safe navigation, automated vehicles need to instantaneously detect receiver and sensor failures and have the capability of excluding possible faults to maintain continuous high-integrity navigation.

Current GNSS technologies are insufficient to support the transition of ground vehicles to full automation in terms of accuracy, integrity, and availability [2]. While analysis indicates that driverless vehicles will need centimeter-level navigation accuracy on local and residential streets [3], single point positioning (SPP) can only achieve meter-level accuracy [4]. Integration of GNSS receivers with an INS improves the navigation solution by taking advantage of the short-term accuracy of the INS, coupled with the long-term stability of the GNSS solution. However, sub-meter-level accuracy is achievable with certain augmentation systems and real-time kinematic (RTK) only under certain favorable conditions [5]. In terms of integrity and availability, recent work demonstrated that in a sample downtown environment (Chicago urban corridor), availability of GPS-only positioning was less than 10% at most locations. While integration of multi-constellation GNSS, INS, wheel speed sensors, zero velocity updates, and vehicle kinematic constraint improved the availability significantly, it was still challenging to maintain availability after the vehicle traversed 4,500 m in an urban environment [6].

Recently, signals of opportunity (SOPs) [7]; e.g., cellular signals [8]–[11], digital television [12], and FM [13]; have been been demonstrated as an attractive alternative or supplement to GNSS signals. For vehicular navigation in urban environments [14]–[16], cellular SOPs are particularly attractive due to their inherent attributes: abundance, geometric and spectral diversity, high received power, and large bandwidth. With the fast deployment of fifth-generation (5G) cellular systems, their navigation capabilities have attracted extensive research efforts [17]–[22]. Recent literature exploited downlink 5G signals and showed favorable positioning accuracy [23], [24].

Integrity monitoring of multi-sensor integrated navigation has attracted research efforts during the last couple of decades [25]. Receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM), which was initially introduced in aviation, has been adapted to account for multi-constellation GNSS measurements [26]...
(e.g., Galileo [27], GLONASS [28], and Beidou [29]), aiding sensors (e.g., INS-GPS [30], lidar-GNSS [31], vision-GPS [32], and multi-sensor collaborative [33]), and terrestrial SOPs [34]–[36]. As tightly-coupled GNSS/INS is widely adopted for vehicular navigation, different integrity monitoring frameworks have been proposed, e.g., extended RAIM [37], solution separation [38], residual-based method [39], and innovation-based method [40]. Initial studies to characterize the integrity monitoring improvement for automated driving, upon fusing GPS signals with terrestrial SOPs, was conducted in [41], [42]. However, the research on FDE for opportunistic navigation, especially for SOP-aided inertial navigation is rarely found in the literature. An extended Kalman filter (EKF)-based solution separation RAIM, which fuses sequential GNSS and SOP measurements was proposed in [43]. Nevertheless, a simple vehicle dynamics models was adopted and no fault exclusion results were presented. This paper extends the previous work by incorporating an INS and developing the FDE algorithm. To this end, a solution separation-based FDE framework is developed for INS/GPS/5G. Solution separation tests are exploited to detect and exclude faults from GPS and 5G signals due to transmitter failures and local threats in urban environments (e.g., multipath). Experimental results are presented to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed framework under different sensor fusion scenarios. It is shown that fusing 5G signals enhances the FDE performance of the multi-sensor system in a suburban scenario: while INS/GPS fails to detect a GPS fault in the INS/GPS system increased the RMSE and maximum position error to 1.83 m and 4.25 m, respectively. The undetected faulty GPS measurements, the INS/GPS/SOP is able to detect and exclude faults from GPS and 5G signals due to transmitter failures and local threats in urban environments. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces navigation models for GPS/SOP-aided INS. Section III describes the proposed integrity monitoring framework. Section IV presents the experiment results in a suburban scenario: while INS/GPS fails to detect a GPS fault in the INS/GPS system increased the RMSE and maximum position error to 1.83 m and 4.25 m, respectively. The undetected faulty GPS measurements, the INS/GPS/SOP is able to detect and exclude faults from GPS and 5G signals due to transmitter failures and local threats in urban environments. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces navigation models for GPS/SOP-aided INS. Section III describes the proposed integrity monitoring framework. Section IV presents the experiment results in a suburban environment and compares the FDE performance of different sensor fusion scenarios. Section V concludes the paper.

II. GPS/SOP-AIDED INERTIAL NAVIGATION

This section describes foundational models for the INS/GPS/SOP tightly coupled navigation framework, including the GPS and terrestrial SOP pseudorange measurement models, the aided INS states, the dynamics of the vehicle-mounted receiver and cellular SOP clocks, and the EKF-based navigation framework.

A. GPS Pseudorange Measurement Model

The ground vehicle is equipped with a receiver which makes pseudorange measurements to M GPS satellites. Let \(z^G(k)\) denote the GPS measurement vector at time-step \(k\) defined as

\[
\mathbf{z}^G(k) = [\mathbf{z}_1^G(k), \ldots, \mathbf{z}_M^G(k)]^T,
\]

where \(\mathbf{z}_m^G(k)\) is the \(m\)-th GPS pseudorange measurement at time-step \(k\), after compensating for ionospheric and tropospheric delays and satellite’s clock bias, which is modeled as

\[
\mathbf{z}_m^G(k) = \|\mathbf{r}_r(k) - \mathbf{r}_m^G(k)\| + c \cdot \delta t_r(k) + \nu_m^G(k),
\]

where \(\mathbf{r}_r(k)\) and \(\mathbf{r}_m^G(k)\) are the receiver and \(m\)-th satellite’s three-dimensional (3–D) position vectors, respectively; \(c\) is the speed of light; \(\delta t_r(k)\) is the GPS receiver’s clock bias; and \(\nu_m^G(k)\) is the measurement noise, which is modeled as a zero-mean white Gaussian sequence with variance \(\sigma_m^G)^2(k)\).

B. Terrestrial SOP Pseudorange Measurement Model

The ground vehicle-mounted receiver also makes pseudorange measurements from N terrestrial SOPs, which are assumed to be stationary with known positions. Let \(z^S_p(k)\) denote the SOP measurement vector at time-step \(k\), defined as

\[
\mathbf{z}^S_p(k) = [\mathbf{z}_1^S_p(k), \ldots, \mathbf{z}_N^S_p(k)]^T,
\]

where \(\mathbf{z}_n^S_p(k)\) is the \(n\)-th SOP measurement at time-step \(k\), which can be modeled as

\[
z_n^S(k) = \|\mathbf{r}_r(k) - \mathbf{r}_n^S\| + c \cdot \delta t_n^S(k) + \nu_n^S(k).
\]

where \(\mathbf{r}_n^S\) and \(\delta t_n^S(k)\) are the 3–D position and clock bias of the \(n\)-th SOP transmitter, respectively; \(\delta t_n^S(k)\) is the the receiver’s clock bias (assumed to be different than the GPS receiver’s clock bias \(\delta t_r(k)\)); and \(\nu_n^S(k)\) is the measurement noise, which is modeled as a zero-mean white Gaussian sequence with variance \(\sigma_n^S)^2(k)\).

C. Aided INS

The vehicle-mounted IMU produces 3–D angular velocity measurements \(\omega_{imu}(k)\) and specific force measurements \(a_{imu}\). An EKF is used to fuse IMU, GPS, and 5G SOP measurements [44]. The EKF state vector is defined as

\[
x \triangleq [\mathbf{q}^T, \mathbf{r}_r^T, \mathbf{r}_r^T, \mathbf{b}_{gyr}^T, \mathbf{b}_{acc}^T, \mathbf{x}_{clk,r}^T, \mathbf{x}_{clk}^T]^T,
\]

where \(\mathbf{b}_q\) is the 4–D unit quaternion, representing the vehicle’s orientation, i.e., rotation from Earth-centered, Earth-fixed (ECEF) frame \(\{e\}\) to vehicle body frame \(\{b\}\), \(\mathbf{r}_r\) is the vehicle’s speed, \(\mathbf{b}_{gyr}\) is the gyroscope’s 3–D bias, \(\mathbf{b}_{acc}\) is the accelerometer’s 3–D bias, \(\mathbf{x}_{clk,r} = [\delta t_r, \delta t_r]^T\) is the GPS receiver clock error state vector, with \(\delta t_r\) denoting the receiver clock drift; and \(\mathbf{x}_{clk}\) captures the difference between the SOP receiver and each of the SOPs’ transmitters clock errors. The discrete-time dynamics of \(\mathbf{x}_{clk,r}\) and \(\mathbf{x}_{clk}^T\) is assumed to follow the standard double integrator model, driven by process noise [44]. The time-update of \(\mathbf{b}_q, \mathbf{r}_r\), and \(\mathbf{r}_r\) are performed using ECEF strapdown mechanization equations with the gyroscope and accelerometer measurements [45]. The EKF measurement-update corrects the time-updated states \(\mathbf{x}(k + 1|k)\) using available GPS and SOP pseudorange measurements. The EKF measurement-updated states \(\mathbf{x}(k + 1|k + 1)\) and associated estimation error covariance \(\mathbf{P}(k+1|k+1)\) are computed using standard EKF update equations [44].
III. SOLUTION SEPARATION-BASED RAIM WITH FDE

This section describes the solution separation-based RAIM for aided INS, which fuses measurements from IMU, GPS, and SOPs, to detect and exclude faults from GPS and SOP measurements. Note that the proposed frameworks assume no fault condition in IMU measurements.

A. Framework Overview

As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed aided INS RAIM framework extends the framework developed in [43] by incorporating INS and fault detection functionality. The integrity monitoring system utilizes a bank of filters, upon which solution separation tests are conducted to detect potential faults from the ranging measurement, while assuming the INS is faultless. When faults are detected, exclusions are tried to resume normal operation.

B. Solution Separation Test

The test statistics are chosen to be the difference between the position estimates from the main filter, \( \hat{x}^{(0)}(k|k) \), and the position estimates from the subfilters, \( \hat{x}^{(i)}(k|k) \) [43]. The test statistics vector can be expressed as

\[
x^{(i)}_{ss}(k) = \hat{x}^{(0)}(k|k) - \hat{x}^{(i)}(k|k), \quad i = 1, \ldots, N_{ss},
\]

where \( N_{ss} \) is the number of subfilters, i.e., the number of failed hypotheses to be monitored.

As shown in [46], the covariance of the \( i \)-th solution separation vector can be computed as

\[
\Sigma^{(i)}_{ss}(k) = P^{(i)}(k|k) - P^{(0)}(k|k).
\]

This enables the framework to calculate \( \Sigma^{(i)}_{ss} \) without having the cross-correlation between the main filter and subfilters.

The test threshold for the \( i \)-th hypothesis in the \( q \)-th direction is set to meet a predefined probability of false alarm \( P_{fa} \) under nominal conditions according to

\[
T_{i,q} = Q^{-1}(\alpha_{i,q}P_{fa})\sigma^{(i)}_{ss,q},
\]

where \( Q^{-1}(\cdot) \) is the inverse \( Q \)-function, \( \alpha_{i,q} \) is the allocation coefficients of the false alarm budget to \( q \) direction of the \( i \)-th fault mode, and \( \sigma^{(i)}_{ss,q} \) is the \( q \)-th diagonal element of \( \Sigma^{(i)}_{ss} \).

C. FDE and Filter Management

After each time-step, when the system receives new pseudo-range measurements, the test statistics of all subsets on all three directions are compared with their corresponding test thresholds. The system will be determined as in normal operation if all the tests pass, i.e.,

\[
x_{ss,q}^{(i)} < T_{i,q}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, N_{ss}, q = 1, 2, 3.
\]

Otherwise, if any of the above tests fails, the system is deemed as in faulty conditions and the fault exclusion algorithm tries to recover the system by excluding the measurements associated with the failed tests.

The fault exclusion algorithm consists of reconstructing the filters and recalculating the estimation solutions. For example, if any of the three tests for the \( i \)-th subset fails at time-step \( k_d \), the subsets will be reconstructed based on the measurements excluding the ones associated with the \( i \)-th subset. The new subsets will be reinitialized based on the estimation solution from the main filter at time-step \( k_d - k_{con} \), where \( k_{con} \) is a design parameter to allow the reconstructed subsets to converge. The reconstructed subsets will be propagated from time \( k_d - k_{con} \) to the current time \( k_d \).

The purport of the recalculation is twofold: (i) to rule out the possibility that the faulty measurements have contaminated the navigation solution before time-step \( k_d \), and (ii) to recover the convergence of the reconstructed subfilter, so that the system can resume normal operation immediately, rather than waiting for future measurements until the filters converge. If the new subsets pass all the solution separation tests at time-step \( k_d \), the system resume to normal operation with the remaining measurements after the exclusion.

Otherwise, an alarm will be raised, as no possible exclusion is available. Algorithm 1 summarizes the FDE and filter management calculations.

Algorithm 1 FDE and filter management

Input: \( N_{ss}, k, k_{con}, \{\hat{x}^{(0)}(j|j)\}_{j=1}^{k}, \{P^{(0)}(j|j)\}_{j=1}^{k}, \{\hat{x}^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss}}, \{P^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss}}, \{z(j)\}_{j=1}^{k}, \{\omega_{imu}(j)\}_{j=1}^{k}, \{a_{imu}(j)\}_{j=1}^{k}\)

Output: \( \{\hat{x}^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss}}, \{P^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss}}\)

1: \( f \leftarrow 0 \)
2: for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, N_{ss}\} \) do
3: \( \) if any test (6) fails for \( \hat{x}^{(i)}(k|k) \) then
4: \( f \leftarrow i \)
5: \( \) break
6: end if
7: end for
8: if \( f \neq 0 \) then
9: \( \{z_e(j)\}_{j=1}^{k} \leftarrow \{z(j)\}_{j=1}^{k} \) excluding \( \{z_f(j)\}_{j=1}^{k} \)
10: \( k_e \leftarrow k - k_{con} \)
11: Reconstruct subsets at \( k_e \)
12: Initialize \( \{\hat{x}_e^{(i)}(k_e|k_e)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss} - 1}, \{P_e^{(i)}(k_e|k_e)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss} - 1} \) with corresponding element from \( \hat{x}^{(0)}(k_e|k_e) \), \( P^{(0)}(k_e|k_e) \)
13: Propagate filters to calculate \( \{\hat{x}_e^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss} - 1}, \{P_e^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss} - 1} \)
14: for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, N_{ss} - 1\} \) do
15: \( \) if any test (6) fails for \( \hat{x}_e^{(i)}(k|k) \) then
16: \( \) \( \) Return Fault with no exclusion
17: \( \) end if
18: end for
19: \( \{\hat{x}_e^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss} - 1} \leftarrow \{\hat{x}_e^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss} - 1} \)
20: \( \{P_e^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss} - 1} \leftarrow \{P_e^{(i)}(k|k)\}_{i=1}^{N_{ss} - 1} \)
21: \( N_{ss} \leftarrow N_{ss} - 1 \)
22: return Fault with exclusion
23: else
24: \( \) return No fault
25: end if

\[ x_{ss,q}^{(i)} < T_{i,q}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, N_{ss}, q = 1, 2, 3. \]
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

To demonstrate the proposed FDE framework and evaluate its performance under different sensor fusion scenarios, i.e., INS/GPS and INS/GPS/SOP, an experiment was conducted with a ground vehicle navigating in a suburban environment while collecting measurements from the on-board IMU, GPS, and two 5G gNBs.

A. Experimental Setup and RAIM Parameters

The experiment was conducted in Costa Mesa, California, USA. Two consumer-grade cellular omnidirectional Laird antennas were connected to a quadchannel National Instrument (NI) universal software radio peripheral (USRP)-2955 which was mounted on a ground vehicle. Two channels of the USRP was set up to sample 5G signals, which were processed by a software-defined radio (SDR) receiver to produce SOP pseudorange measurements. The vehicle was also equipped with a Septentrio AsteRx-i V integrated GNSS-IMU system to produce an RTK-corrected navigation solution, which are used as ground truth in this experiment. The raw IMU measurements and GPS pseudoranges from the Septentrio GNSS-IMU system are fed into the proposed framework to produce an INS/GPS/5G navigation solution and support FDE.

During the experiment, the ground vehicle was able to track 9 GPS satellites and receive 5G signals from 2 ambient gNB towers. The experiment environment and 5G tower locations are shown in Fig. 2.

The integrity risk budget, i.e., probability of hazardous misleading information (PHMI), are set to be $10^{-4}/h$. The probability of false alert is targeted at $10^{-3}/h$. The probability of fault for both GPS and 5G towers is set to be $10^{-2}/h$ and the time of influence for each fault is set to be 120 s. Considering the measurement rate in this experiment is 5 Hz yields RAIM parameters in the notation of per point as shown in Table I.

Since the experiment was conducted in a suburban environment, which was not as challenging for GPS and 5G signals, and the GPS and 5G pseudorange measurements were produced by advanced receivers, no faults appeared in the pseudoranges. To mimic GPS faults, it was hypothesized that the ionospheric and tropospheric errors for the GPS satellite with PRN 7 were not properly corrected, which caused ranging errors with an average magnitude of 4.57 m.

The ground vehicle traversed a trajectory of 1.91 km in 200 seconds. The proposed framework was first implemented by fusing INS and GPS measurements. As shown in Fig. 3, the test statistic of INS/GPS did not surpass the test threshold, which indicates that the system failed to detect the hypothesized fault in the GPS satellite. However, in the case where two 5G towers were fused, the test statistic increased and test threshold decreased to a level that the system could detect the GPS fault.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>${\sigma_{UR_{i,m}}}_{m=1}^M$</td>
<td>User Range Error for GPS</td>
<td>5 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${\sigma_{ER_{i,n}}}_{n=1}^N$</td>
<td>User Range Error for SOP</td>
<td>5.48 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$PHMI_{HOR}$</td>
<td>Integrity budget for the horizontal component</td>
<td>$1.1 \times 10^{-9}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$PHMI_{VERT}$</td>
<td>Integrity budget for the vertical component</td>
<td>$1.1 \times 10^{-11}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_{ha,HOR}$</td>
<td>Continuity budget allocated to the vertical component</td>
<td>$5.6 \times 10^{-8}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_{ha,VERT}$</td>
<td>Continuity budget allocated to the vertical component</td>
<td>$5.6 \times 10^{-10}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${P_{GPS_{m}}}_{m=1}^M$</td>
<td>Probability of a single GPS satellite fault</td>
<td>$5.6 \times 10^{-7}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${P_{SOP_{n}}}_{n=1}^N$</td>
<td>Probability of a single SOP fault</td>
<td>$5.6 \times 10^{-7}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the fault got excluded by the FDE algorithm described in Section III-C, the INS/GPS/5G achieved a position RMSE of 0.81 m and maximum position error of 2.17 m. The undetected GPS fault increased the RMSE and maximum position error to 1.83 m and 4.25 m, respectively, as summarized in Table II.

### Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INS/GPS</th>
<th>INS/GPS/5G</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMSE (m)</td>
<td>1.8309</td>
<td>0.8116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum error (m)</td>
<td>4.2505</td>
<td>2.1686</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. CONCLUSION

This paper developed a solution separation-based RAIM framework for INS/GPS/5G tightly-coupled navigation systems. This framework conducts solution separation tests to instantaneously detect and exclude ranging measurement faults from GPS and SOP. The FDE performance of the proposed framework was validated experimentally, where 5G signals were exploited to improve FDE over fusing INS only with GPS signals. It was shown that fusing 5G enables the system to detect a fault from GPS satellites, which fusing only INS and GPS fails to detect. With the faulty measurements detected and excluded, INS/GPS/5G achieved a position RMSE of 0.81 m, while INS/GPS yielded a RMSE of 1.83 m. The FDE also reduced the maximum error from 4.25 m to 2.17 m.

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